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Notes and Comments
Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics
Vertical Restraints: An End to Antitrust
Relief for Terminated Discounters?
I.

Introduction

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 18901 (the Act) was the legislative response to the accumulation of economic power which resulted from the Industrial Revolution.' The statute prohibits
agreements between parties to restrict competition, which are
known as restraints of trade.8 It also prohibits a single firm from
gaining excessive economic power, which is known as monopolization."
Because of the Sherman Act's general terms, courts have
used case law to establish a working body of judicial standards.'
The Supreme Court has had many opportunities to apply these
1. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
2. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
3. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides criminal penalties for "[elvery contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
The Clayton Act of 1914 was passed to specify more clearly those acts which are illegal
and to provide civil remedies in addition to criminal penalties for certain practices. See

E. GELLHORN,

ANTITRUST LAW AND

ECONoMics 27-30 (1981). Section 4 of the Clayton Act

allows an injured private plaintiff to "recover three-fold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
4. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
5. "Congress ... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate . . . its
application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it
expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978). See also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTITRUST

L.J. 135, 136 (1984).
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standards to vertical restraints of trade6 in the century since the
Act was passed. 7 The Court, however, has not applied a consistent evidentiary standard to arrive at its decisions.' Over the last
decade, the Court has narrowly construed the statute in favor of
defendants9 and has advocated examining the effect of challenged behavior on economic efficiency in determining whether a
plaintiff will succeed in his action."0
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to remedy
one of these evidentiary standard inconsistencies in a case involving the termination of a discounter" by a manufacturer in
response to a competitor's complaints, where liability depends
on whether the termination is characterized as a vertical price or
nonprice restraint. 12 In Business Electronics v. Sharp Electron6. Vertical restraints are imposed by a party at a higher level in a distribution chain
on a party at a lower level in a distribution chain. "For example, a retailer is related
vertically to his distributor, and a distributor is related vertically to his supplier." Jacobson, On Terminating Price-Cutting Distributors in Response to Competitors' Complaints, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 677, 680 n.19 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(manufacturer established wholesale and retail prices by contract); Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (limitations on number of retail franchisees and
locations from which franchisees could sell).
In contrast, horizontal restraints are restrictive agreements between parties at the
same level in a distribution chain. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596
(1972) (association of supermarket chains which allocated sales territories to minimize
competition).
8. The Court changed evidentiary standards for evaluating the illegality of restrictions on dealer territories and customers twice in fifteen years. White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (illegality of selling only to those dealers which agreed
to sell only to customers not reserved to the manufacturer must be determined at trial);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (restricting distributors to
sell within exclusive territories is presumed to be anticompetitive and thus per se illegal);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (terminated dealer has
the burden of showing that restrictions are anticompetitive).
9. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (plaintiff must show that territorial restrictions are
anticompetitive); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (terminated discounter must prove that its competitor and supplier conspired to achieve an
unlawful objective); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986) (summary judgment granted when evidence is as consistent with independent action as with an illegal conspiracy).
10. See, e.g., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59.
11. "[T]he discounters of modern American marketing [are those] low overhead,
high volume sellers who aggressively compete as to price." Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEo.
L.J. 1487, 1493 (1983).
12. Vertical price restraints are those restraints which specifically set a resale price.
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ics,' s the Court determined that the potential antitrust violation
by the manufacturer should be judged using the rule of reason."
In reaching its decision, the Court characterized the restraint as
nonprice, since the alleged offending parties
did not have an
15
agreement on specific prices or price levels.
Because it will be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to
prove an explicit price fixing agreement, a terminated discounter's chance of success in an antitrust case is now greatly
reduced." Indeed, since the Business Electronics decision, no
dealer terminated in response to a competitor's complaints has
prevailed against the manufacturer.17
By using the price/nonprice distinction to determine the
proper evidentiary standard, the Court concentrates on the form
See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text. They have consistently been ruled per se
illegal. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
Vertical nonprice restrictions, such as restricted territories or customer sets, are those
restraints which use means other than price to achieve the manufacturer's distributional
objectives. See infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text. They are judged using the rule
of reason. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59. Customer restrictions can include, for example,
reservation of particular customers for the manufacturer, White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at
256, or prohibiting distributors from selling to unfranchised retailers, Schwinn, 388 U.S.
at 371. The rule of reason takes all the circumstances of a given case into account to
determine if damage to competition has actually occurred. See Pitofsky, supra note 11,
at 1489. For a more detailed explanation of these evidentiary standards, see infra notes
39-67 and accompanying text.
13. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
14. Id. at 1520, 1525. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the rule of reason.
15. Id. at 1521. The Court did not attempt to reconcile the inconsistent antitrust
treatment given to similar conduct depending upon whether the termination is considered a price or nonprice vertical restraint. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying
text.
16. As the dissent in a recent post-Business Elecs. case has stated, "because pricefixing agreements are per se illegal, antitrust conspirators tend to be perceptive enough
to avoid express written agreements and to deny the existence of any combination or
conspiracy; they also tend to avoid leaving incriminating evidence lying about." The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
17. See, e.g., The Jeanery, 849 F.2d 1148 (judgment notwithstanding the verdict
granted to a manufacturer which terminated the plaintiff discounter after a threat by the
plaintiff's competitor to discontinue its purchases from the manufacturer); Dunnivant v.
Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1988) (summary judgment for an auto
parts supplier which terminated a retail dealer in response to plaintiff's competitors' discontinuing purchases from the supplier); Corrosion Resistant Materials Co. v. Steelite,
Inc., 692 F. Supp. 407 (D.N.J. 1988) (summary judgment for manufacturer, initially denied, granted after Business Electronics decision).
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of the restraint rather than its substantative effect on competition. This Note suggests that a set of objective factors should be
used to determine whether terminating a discounter is likely to
have anticompetitive effects. If so, that termination should be
per se illegal regardless of whether it is a price or a nonprice
restraint. "
Part II of this Note examines the development of vertical
restraints law. A review of the theories interpreting the purposes
of antitrust law is provided as a background for understanding
the analysis of subsequent decisions. Included in this review are
the rationales for the per se rule and the rule of reason standards. Part II continues with a review of vertical restraints
cases, concluding with the development of discounter-termination case law. The facts and the lower court decisions of Business Electronics are provided in Part III, which concludes with
an analysis of both Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice
Stevens' dissent.
Part IV argues that the price/nonprice distinction is not a
valid means for establishing evidentiary standards and that retention of a per se rule in certain circumstances is justified, especially in light of the legislative intent behind the Sherman
Act. A proposed test in Part IV focuses on the probability that
terminating a discounter will have an anticompetitive effect. Application of the proposed test to the facts of Business Electronics shows that although the Court's reasoning and enunciated
standard is flawed, its result is sound: the case should be judged
using the rule of reason. Part V concludes that using categories
of conduct to establish rules, rather than concentrating on upholding the purposes of the Sherman Act, will provide a legal
sanction for anticompetitive conduct in some cases. This is true
because a given discounter termination can often fit into either
the price or nonprice category.

18. Conversely, if the restraint is unlikely to have an anticompetitive effect, its legality should not turn on its characterization as price or nonprice.
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II. Background
A. Development of Antitrust Standards
To evaluate the wisdom of the Business Electronics decision, it is necessary to understand the purposes of the Sherman
Act and the development of the two evidentiary standards, the
per se rule and the rule of reason.
Various inferences can be drawn from the general language
of the Sherman Act. It is clear from the general wording of the
statute that common-law principles were intended to be used to
develop a set of judicially workable standards. 19 Application of
these principles to restraints of trade generated the general rule
that restraints ancillary to genuine business transactions are legal, while those whose only purpose is to restrain trade are not. 0
19. The statute prohibits "[elvery ... restraint of trade .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the application of common-law principles to interpret this general language, see Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 136-37; Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7, 37 (1966).
20. For the preeminent discussion of this concept, see Judge Taft's opinion in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.2d 271, 278-91 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899):
[T]he contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the c6venant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted only to
protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the execution of the contract
or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer from the unrestrained competition of the
other. The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of protection
needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of
such restraints may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the restraint exceeds the necessity presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void for
two reasons: First, because it oppresses the covenantor, without any corresponding
benefit to the covenantee; and, second, because it tends to a monopoly. But where
the sole object of both parties in making the contract as expressed therein is
merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem
that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily
have a tendency to monopoly, and therefore would be void. In such a case there is
no measure of what is necessary to the protection of either party, except the vague
and varying opinions of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy,
men ought to be allowed to restrain competition. There is in such contracts no
main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is permitted, and by
which its reasonableness is measured, but the sole object is to restrain trade in
order to avoid the competition which it has always been the policy of the common
law to foster.
Id. at 282-83.
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1. Purposes of Antitrust Law
Following the Civil War, the United States expanded rapidly into an industrialized society.2 1 A concentration of economic
power accompanied this expansion, creating large business entities, known as trusts, which used their power to eliminate competition.12 The public was outraged over the increased prices
which resulted and called for legislation to end the anticompetitive conditions.2 8 The Sherman Act was passed in response to
2
this call. '

It is clear from its legislative history that the Act was intended to protect consumers from the harmful effects trusts had
on competition. 5 However, opinions diverge in defining exactly
what this means.
One school of thought, exemplified by the efficiency theory
of the Chicago School of economists, 2 holds that "consumer
welfare" is the sole purpose of the Sherman Act.27 Although
seemingly an attractive purpose, consumer welfare is not defined
as one might think. It does not mean providing the lowest prices
through the open competition of a multitude of competitors, but
the improvement of "allocative efficiency without impairing proThe problem with this interpretation is
ductive efficiency .... ,,2'

21. 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1, at 126 (1980).
22. Id. The trusts accomplished this by rapidly absorbing smaller businesses, often
through predatory tactics, such as below cost pricing and industrial espionage. For a
summary of these and other unfair methods used by the trusts, see E. GELLHORN, supra
note 3, at 16-19.
23. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
1140, 1147 (1981). For a discussion of the events surrounding the passage of the Sherman

Act, see H.

THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY

(1955).

24. Fox, supra note 23, at 1147-48.
25. For a comprehensive collection of legislative history of the Sherman Act, see 1 E.
KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES

(1978).
26. The most complete statement of the Chicago School's position is found in R.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX

(1978). Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analy-

sis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 926 n.2 (1979).
27. R. BOREK, supra note 26, at 9.
28. Id. at 91. Allocative efficiency may be simply defined as making what the consumer wants, whereas productive efficiency is using the least amount of resources to do
so. E. GELLHORN, supra note 3, at 41. For a more complete discussion see R. BORK, supra
note 19. For an interpretation of legislative history supporting the efficiency model of the
Chicago School, see Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.
& ECON. 7 (1966). According to the efficiency model, only that behavior which causes
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that the organization which can produce goods most efficiently is
probably the largest, most integrated organization - precisely
the kind of economic entity the Sherman Act was passed to control.29 Although the Act does not condemn large size per se, 0 an
organization with an inordinately large market share is most
able to engage in the type of practices the Act forbids, namely
the "exclusion of competitors, the consolidation and persistence
of monopoly power, and ultimately higher prices and reduced
output."'"
The second school of thought, sometimes called "Populist"
or "Interventionist, '32 argues that consumers' interests are protected by: "(1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and
opportunity to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the competition process as market
governor." 33 This school advocates the preservation of competition by maintaining the freedom to compete, even at the risk of
potentially higher short-term consumer costs. The theory contends that this protection of competition will result in lower
34
costs over the long term.

restriction of output is harmful and worthy of the attention of antitrust law. R. BORK,
supra note 26, at 107-15.
29. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text; "[Viertical integration usually is
procompetitive. If there are cost savings from bringing into the firm a function formerly
performed outside it, the firm will be made a more effective competitor." Jack Walters &
Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.) (summary
judgment upheld where manufacturer displaced dealer in retail market), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
30. E. GELLHORN, supra note 3, at 112.
31. Id. See also Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 933, 938 (1987); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59, 63-64
(1977) (White, J., concurring); Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing,Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARv. L. REV. 983, 990-92 (1985).
32. See Piraino, The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution,63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1988); Fox, supra note 23, at 1143
n.12.
33. Fox, supra note 23, at 1182. In the context used, "on the merits" means free of
the advantage a competitor has when a restraint of trade is in place. Id. at 1189. See also
Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095 (1986).
34. Fox, supra note 23, at 1142. "[lt is not clear that antitrust enforcement has in
fact imposed costs on consumers. Statements [of the Court] may be read as ... supporting a process of competition that will probably benefit consumers over the long run." Id.
at 1142 n.7.
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The ambiguous statutory language and legislative history 5
of the Sherman Act do not resolve this dichotomy. Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court indicate, however, that preservation of the opportunity to compete is the overriding concern
of antitrust law. The Court stated that a restraint can be illegal
even if its immediate effect is to reduce prices." Reinforcing this
view, the Court has also stated that "'one of [the Act's] purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible costs, an organization of industry in small units
which can effectively compete with each other.' ,,17 In more recent years the Court has impliedly reiterated this view. 38
2.

The Rule of Reason

Taken literally, the effect of the Sherman Act 9 would be to
render all private business agreements illegal, since it is the intention and result of contracts between business parties generally to restrain trade to some extent. In United States v. TransMissouri Freight Association,40 the Court used this literal inter-

35. "[The] simple [statutory] formulation is not self-defining, and conceals a diversity of possible objectives that are substantially consistent but yet sometimes inconsis-

tent in critical respects." 1 P.

AREEDA

& D.

TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW

7 (1978). "Neither

the language nor the legislative history ... is very illuminating about what specifically is
allowed or prohibited." Id. at 14.
36. The Court made this statement in a case where the effect of the restraint was
probably to maintain prices, not to reduce prices. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am.,
Inc., v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941).
37. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 n.7 (1966) (quoting
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945)). Some have
questioned this view as foreign producers with high quality goods have invaded the
American market in recent years. See generally Piraino, supra note 32, at 19-23.
38. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). "The essence of the antitrust laws
is to ensure fair price competition in an open market." Id. at 342. See also NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (focus is to examine restraint in terms of its
effect on competition). Reiter was used to support the efficiency model of antitrust law
in Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986). However, in the
same section of Reiter as is used to support this view, the Court states: "It is in the
sound commercial interests of ... purchasers .. .to obtain the lowest price possible
within the framework of our competitive ... system" and "the leading proponents ...
perceived . . . § 4 as a means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from
price fixing." 442 U.S. at 342-43.
39. The Act provides criminal penalties for "[e]very contract, combination .. . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (emphasis added).
40. 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (railroad association formed to determined rates, rules, and
regulations held to be illegal).
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pretation to hold price fixing and territorial divisions illegal because the statute prohibited every restraint of trade."However,
the Court quickly retreated from this position in United States
v. Joint Traffic Association,4 holding that legitimate business
agreements which did not directly restrain interstate commerce
were not proscribed by the Act.
The seeds of the current interpretations of the Sherman Act
were sown in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,5 the case
which mandated dissolution of the Standard Oil trust. 44 The
Court held that the broad statutory language was intended to
cover unknown future undue restraints and not to prohibit ordinary business contracts. 45 The standard to be used in determining whether a restraint was undue was the "standard of
reason."46
The court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, and
the purpose or end sought to be attained are all relevant
facts.' 7
The rule of reason standard is thus intended to take all competitive factors into account in determining whether a particular restraint is illegal.
Some courts have interpreted this rule as requiring proof of
41. Id. at 328.
When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, etc., the plain
and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract
alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in
such language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the
act that which has been omitted by Congress.
Id.
42. 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (railroad association similar to that in Trans-Missouri
held to be illegal).
43. 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (accumulation by trust of stock of majority of U.S. oil
companies).
44. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 3, at 26.
45. 221 U.S. at 59-60.
46. Id. at 60.
47. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (rule prohibiting
Board members from selling grain contracts after close of business at price other than
closing price does not violate Sherman Act).

9

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:507

the existence of a relevant market and proof that the defendant
has exerted power4 s in this market.' 9 This approach has been
criticized, however, as converting a Sherman Act section 2 case
into a Sherman Act section 1 case.5 0 The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, has not generally required proof of market power to
find an unreasonable restraint of trade. 1 In today's complex
business environment, application of the rule of reason usually
results in complicated, expensive litigation, which places an extreme burden on a plaintiff.52
3. The Per Se Rule
To eliminate the unfairness which the rule of reason places
on the plaintiff,53 courts have established a rule of per se liabil48. "Market power is the ability to raise prices by restricting output ....
[In economic terms [it] is the ability to raise price[s] without a total loss of sales." 2 P. AREEDA

& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST

LAW

322 (1978). Market power is one of the two elements of the

offense of monopolizing, the other being "willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (plumbing supply
company illegally acquired and maintained market power).
49. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
50. See supra notes 3, 4 for the text of sections 1 and 2. By focusing on market

power, attention is moved from the nature of the restraint to the structure of the industry, conflicting with the language of section 1, which prohibits restraints of trade, not
monopolies. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 1145-46.
51. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (failure of FTC to
engage in market analysis in conducting rule of reason analysis not fatal to finding that
Federation's policies violated antitrust statutes). "As a matter of law, the absence of
proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output." NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (NCAA's limitation on number of televised
football games found to be anticompetitive using rule of reason analysis).
52. To illustrate the complexity of today's antitrust cases, consider Justice Powell's
introduction to his opinion in a recent case:
Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opinion of the . . . Third
Circuit runs to 69 pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than
three times as long ....

Two respected District Judges each have authored a

number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the parties have filed a forty-volume
appendix in this Court ....
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 (1986). See also
Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1489. In an article written while he was at the University of
Chicago, Judge Posner stated: "[T]he Rule of Reason is ... little more than a euphemism for nonliability." Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
53. The rule of reason is unfair due to the heavy evidentiary burden it places on the
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ity if the "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue""4 eliminate the need for any "elaborate inquiry
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use."" Per se liability thus creates a presumption of
liability which shifts the burden of showing a lack of anticompetitive effect to the defendant." Per se liability has been imposed
in cases dealing with market division, 67 horizontal5 8 and vertical" minimum price fixing, group boycotts, 60 maximum price fixing,6 certain types of reciprocal dealing," tying," and customer
restrictions. 4 However, as American manufacturers have been
assaulted by foreign competition in recent years, 5 commentators
plaintiff. Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1489.
54. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (preferential routing agreements per se illegal).
55. Id.
56. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 1143; Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S.Ct.
1515, 1535 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Market division exists when normally competing companies agree not to compete in certain geographic areas. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951) (allocation of international markets for bearings).
58. Horizontal price fixing is an agreement between competitors on the minimum
prices to be charged. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (agreements between competing oil companies to set prices).
59. Vertical price fixing is imposition of a price, below which the product may not
be sold, by a party at a higher level in a distribution chain on a party at a lower level in
that distribution chain. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911).
60. A group boycott is an agreement between several parties to act jointly to exclude
another party, at either the same or an adjacent level in the distribution chain, from the
relevant market. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(conspiracy between manufacturers and department store not to sell to competing department store).
61. Maximum price fixing is imposition of a maximum price by a manufacturer on a
distributor or retailer. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (imposition
by publisher of maximum newspaper price).
62. Reciprocal dealing exists when two entities agree to buy goods from each other,
to the exclusion of legitimate competition. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
380 U.S. 592 (1965) (parent company used its purchasing power to coerce its suppliers to
buy from its subsidiary).
63. Tying exists when the sale of one product (the tying product) is conditioned
upon future purchases of other products (the tied products). See, e.g., Fortner Enters.,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (offer of credit services tied to
purchase of prefabricated houses).
64. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
65. For a discussion of the inroads of foreign competition, see Piraino, supra note
32, at 19-23. In conjunction, the efficiency theory of antitrust law has gained more adher-
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have called for narrower application of per se illegality, 6 and the
Supreme Court has responded by eliminating per se illegality for
vertical nonprice restraints.
B.

Evolution of Vertical Price Fixing Doctrine

The Supreme Court's first attack on vertical price fixing
came in 1911. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co.,66 Dr. Miles, a pharmaceutical company, entered into contracts with its wholesale and retail dealers, setting the minimum
prices for which its products could be resold. 9 The Court invalidated these contracts based on the common-law prohibition
against restraints on alienation.7 0 It also stated that the effect of
these contracts was similar to the effect of horizontal price fixing
agreements between dealers. 1
The Court narrowed the Dr. Miles rule in United States v.
Colgate & Co. 72 In Colgate, the manufacturer fixed resale prices
by dictating that no sales would be made to dealers not adhering
to its pricing policy.7 s The Court distinguished Dr. Miles because Colgate's policy was unilaterally imposed. 7 The agreement
in Dr. Miles was presumably the result of bargaining between
both parties.7 5 This exemption from antitrust liability when resale prices are unilaterally imposed has come to be known as the
ents. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the efficiency
theory. "[T]he current national mood reflects a growing concern for productive efficiency.
Meanwhile, antitrust law has become both target and scapegoat. Critics condemn decisions as frustrating the achievement of efficiency." Fox, supra note 23, at 1143.
66. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 52; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE

L.J. 373 (1966).
67. Schwinn was overruled in 1977 by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (application of per se rule must be based on demonstrable economic
effect). See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
68. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
69. Id. at 375-80.
70. Id. at 404.
71. Id. at 408. For a discussion that this holding does not correctly state the common-law view and that there is a significant difference between a manufacturer-imposed
vertical price restraint and a horizontal agreement between dealers see Hay, Vertical
Restraints After Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 418, 419-20 n.9, 421-23 (1985).
72. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
73. Id. at 303.
74. Id. at 307-08.
75. Dr. Miles, Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 375-80 (1911).
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"Colgate" doctrine. 7' The exemption from liability which Colgate offered was, however, considerably
restricted in United
7
Co.
&
Davis
Parke,
v.
States
Parke, Davis' catalog stated its policy to deal only with
those who observed its pricing schedule.7 In addition to this
statement in its catalog, Parke, Davis representatives made visits to noncomplying dealers threatening to discontinue their
supply. 79 The Court held that these actions went beyond a unilateral refusal to deal, and were thus per se illegal.8 0 Although
Justice Harlan's strongly worded dissent argued that the majority had emasculated Colgate,81 the doctrine has found growing
support in recent years.8 "
The Court further restricted the Dr. Miles rule in United
States v. General Electric Co.8 3 In this case, General Electric
had consigned its electric lamps to agents which were under its
strict control.8 4 The Court allowed this agreement, distinguishing the agreements in Dr. Miles as mere attempts to create
agencies when the dealers were in fact independent.8 5 In Simp76. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984) (termination of discounter found not to be a unilateral action).
77. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
78. Id. at 32.
79. Id. at 33-36.
80. Id. at 37-45. The Court reviewed several decisions which had restricted the Colgate holding in arriving at its decision. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922) (marking products to detect violations combined with reinstatement of dealership
after assurances of future compliance were given goes beyond what is allowed by Colgate); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (wholesalers'
active cooperation in plan negates application of Colgate doctrine).
81. "Scrutiny of the opinion will reveal that the Court has done no less than send to
its demise the Colgate doctrine which has been a basic part of antitrust law concepts
since it was first announced in 1919 .... " 362 U.S. at 49 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. The Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-64
(1984), expressly reaffirmed the Colgate doctrine. For lower court decisions subsequent
to Monsanto using the doctrine in their decisions, see Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1985) (evidence of discussions
between competitor and manufacturer insufficient to rebut Colgate inference); Winter
Hill Frozen Foods & Serv., Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F. Supp. 539, 543 (D. Mass.
1988) (unilateral refusal to deal is allowed by the Colgate doctrine).
83. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
84. The consignees' stock was returnable at the dictate of General Electric (GE).
The lamps remained the property of GE and the proceeds from their sale were held in
trust for GE by the consignees. The consignees could return unused stock and receive a
commission for sales made. Id. at 481-83.
85. The Court thus further restricted Dr. Miles' rule of per se illegality for goods
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son v. Union Oil Co. of California," the Court limited the General Electric exemption from liability to consignors of patented
goods where the consignor bore most of the risk of loss. 7 The
Simpson rule - invalidating price fixing agreements pursuant
to an agency contract - has subsequently been limited to cases
in which "the name 'agent' [is given] to one who serves the same
economic functions as an ordinary wholesaler or retailer"88 to
circumvent the rule against price fixing.8 9
Although the Justice Department in the Reagan administration encouraged challenges to the per se rule against vertical
price fixing, 90 the Supreme Court has consistently held that verconsigned to a dealer in a valid agency contract. See id. at 487.
86. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
87. Id. at 22-24. The General Electric Court, however, specifically stated that iA
holding was not limited to consignors of patented goods: "The owner of an article, patented or otherwise, is not violating ... the Anti-Trust law, by ... fixing the price by
which his agents transfer the title from him directly to ... [a] consumer." General Electric, 272 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added).
88. Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 726 (7th
Cir. 1986) (airline which terminates travel agent not subject to per se liability).
89. Id. at 725-26. See also Kowalski v. Chicago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 172 (7th
Cir. 1988) (newspaper distribution agreements are bona fide agency contracts). Prohibition of resale to unfranchised retailers by agent consignees was upheld in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), wherein the Court held that the same
restrictions on buyers are per se illegal. The holding of per se illegality was later overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See infra notes
108-111 and accompanying text.
90. The Justice Department filed an amicus brief in Monsanto, advocating elimination of per se illegality of vertical price fixing. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914). It has
also published guidelines stating that only agreements which explicitly set resale prices
are vertical price restraints and thus per se illegal. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL
RESTRAINT GUIDELINES, reprinted in 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Special
Supplement, at 5 (Jan. 24, 1985). This position has been strongly criticized. Representative John Seiberling argues that, given the express intent of Congress in repealing the
Fair Trade Laws in 1975, a radical change in the pro-consumer interpretations of the
Sherman Act is unwarranted. Seiberling, Congress Makes Laws; The Executive Should
Enforce Them, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (1984). Additionally, the Justice Department position has been repudiated by Congress in the Justice Department's 1986 Appropriations
Bill, which stated:
Whereas such policy guidelines are inconsistent with established antitrust law, as
reflected in Supreme Court decisions and statements of congressional intent, in
maintaining that such policy guidelines do not treat vertical price fixing when, in
fact, some provisions of such policy guidelines suggest that certain price fixing
conspiracies are legal if such conspiracies are 'limited' to restricting intrabrand
competition ... qualifying the accepted rule that vertical price fixing in any context is illegal per se; in stating that vertical restraints that have an impact upon
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tical price fixing remains per se illegal."' The Court's consistent
position has not, however, prevented extensive criticism of retention of the rule by commentators and judges. 2
C.

Vertical Nonprice Restraints

Nonprice vertical restraints are restraints which do not dictate resale prices. Typical nonprice restraints include restrictions on sales locations,9 3 territorial restrictions,9 4 customer restrictions, 95 modification of distribution systems, 9 and requireprices are subject to the per se rule of illegality only if there is an 'explicit agreement as to the specific prices.. .'; in stating that restraints imposed by a manufacturer at the request of dealers are vertical in nature and therefore not subject to
the per se rule of illegality ....
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-180, 99 Stat. 1136, 1169 (1985).
91. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987) (state statute specifying
minimum liquor retail price per se illegal); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (state regulation of retail wine prices per se
illegal).
92. A greatly abbreviated sample of this criticism includes: Easterbrook, supra note
5; Posner, supra note 52; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 69
(1977) (White, J., concurring); Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 780 F.2d 1212, 1221-22
(5th Cir. 1986) (Jones, J., concurring), afl'd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988); Morrison v. Murray
Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1438 (7th Cir. 1986). But see Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 730-31 (7th Cir. 1986) (Flaum, J., concurring)
(criticizing Judge Easterbrook for dicta contrary to Supreme Court decisions).
The Supreme Court was not the only governmental body with an inconsistent approach to vertical price fixing. Between 1937 and 1975, through the Fair Trade legislation embodied in the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, Congress allowed states to permit resale price maintenance when branded goods were "in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced and distributed by others .... "
See Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890);
McGuire Act, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952). See generally United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (resale price maintenance not allowed when direct
competition existed between independent wholesalers and drug company's wholesale operations). For an example of a state fair trade statute, see N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 369-a
(McKinney 1968). This statute was amended in 1975 to prohibit all resale price maintenance. N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 369-a (McKinney 1984). However, despite manufacturers arguing that Fair Trade laws were necessary to protect full-service retailers, Congress
found that the legislation resulted in higher prices for consumers and repealed both of
the acts in 1975. H.R. REP. No. 341, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 1 (1975).
93. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
94. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (assignation of
'exclusive territories); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975) (establishment of exclusive territories, eliminating independent retail dealers), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 936 (1976).
95. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (assignment of
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ments for retail promotion and services.9 7
The Supreme Court first faced the issue of vertical nonprice
restraints in White Motor Co. v. United States. 8 In White, the
Court declined to impose a rule of per se illegality on the restrictive territorial and customer clauses in a truck manufacturer's
dealership agreements, professing a lack of knowledge of the economic consequences of such agreements. 9 In his dissent, Justice Clark argued that the motives of the company and its dealers were intertwined, thus clearly exhibiting concerted action to
restrain competition.10 0
Four years later, the Court faced the issue of nonprice restraints again in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.10 1
Schwinn, at the time the leading manufacturer of bicycles in the
United States, had a complicated distribution system involving
both independent dealers who bought the product outright and
consignees.1 02 This system entailed territorial and customer restrictions which enabled Schwinn to control the number of retailers in a given area.10 3 The Court acknowledged the need for
examining the impact of these practices on the marketplace, 0 4
but held that placing restrictions on those dealers who pur-

customers); Terry's Floor Fashions v. Burlington Indus., 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985)
(restricting sales to only residential consumers through pricing structure); H.L. Moore
Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1981) (sales to wholesaler only if it
had no retail stores), cert. denied 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
96. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.) (realignment of assigned territories), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 488 (1987), Fuchs Sugars &
Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 602 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.) (replaced general brokers with
direct brokers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979).
97. McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986)
(failure to advertise, display, and service furniture in a manner consistent with manufacturer's policies), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); National Marine Elec. Distrib. v.
Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985) (failure to maintain service department). For
further discussion of retail promotion and service requirements, see infra notes 118-120
and accompanying text.
98. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
99. "We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to decide ....
Id. at 263.
100. Id. at 280 (Clark, J., dissenting).
101. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
102. Id. at 368-71.
103. Id.
104. "[H]ere we must look to the specifics of the challenged practices and their impact upon the marketplace ... " Id. at 374.
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chased the bikes outright was per se illegal. 105 The Court further
held that restrictions on consignees should be judged according
to the rule of reason. 0 6 The Schwinn decision prompted a
firestorm of controversy and commentary, most of it critical of
the decision, 1° resulting in the Court overruling Schwinn in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.' °
In his majority opinion, Justice Powell considered the complexity of vertical nonprice restraints, with their "potential for a
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition.' 1 9 The Court recognized that
vertical restraints may be necessary to induce dealers to provide
needed services and thus, absent a "demonstrable economic effect,""' all vertical nonprice restrictions would be judged using a
rule of reason evidentiary, standard."'
The Sylvania decision was viewed with approval by advocates of the efficiency theory of antitrust law, who then began to
call for elimination of per se illegality for vertical price restraints
as well.1 2 However, as noted previously, their calls have gone

105. Id. at 379.
106. The Court reiterated the Dr. Miles rule that "it is unreasonable without more
for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article
may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it." Id. at 379.
107. For a bibliography of this commentary, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13 (1977).
108. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Sylvania Court dictated that all vertical nonprice restraints, absent unusual circumstances, are to be judged using a rule of reason standard.
Id. at 58-59. It did not elaborate on what these circumstances might be. Id.
109. Id. at 51-52. "Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same generic product .... In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors - wholesale or retail - of the product of a particular
manufacturer." Id. at 52 n.19.
110. Id. at 58-59. This reasoning conforms with that of the efficiency school. See
supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. This analysis was first propounded by Aaron
Director at the University of Chicago in the 1950s and elaborated in Telser, Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). The work of Director
formed the basis for the ideas of the Chicago School. See Posner, supra note 26, at 92528.
111. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59.
112. See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Restraints:Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171;
Posner, supra note 52. Judge (then-Professor) Posner later advocated that vertical restraints be judged per se legal, placing the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to rebut
the inference of legality. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 6 (1981).
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unheeded by the Supreme Court. " 3
D.

Discounter Termination Cases
1.

Evolution of Case Law Prior to Monsanto

In the situation where a discount dealer is terminated by a
manufacturer pursuant to complaints from a competing fullprice dealer, the paradox of attempting to categorize the termination as either a price or nonprice restraint for the purposes of
determining the proper evidentiary standard is fully revealed.
The terminated discounter will insist that its termination was
part of a price fixing conspiracy between its competitor and supplier, hoping the court will invoke a rule of per se illegality. " 4
The manufacturer, on the other hand, will just as strenuously
argue that its decision was independently based on the discounter's failure to provide the services that the manufacturer
feels are necessary to promote its product.11 5 The problem for
the manufacturer is that "it is precisely in cases in which the
manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often costly nonprice restrictions
that it will have the most interest in the distributors' resale
prices. '""' In spite of this difficulty, prior to Business Electronics, the Court had never required an explicit agreement on
prices to find per se illegality in a discounter termination case. " '
Termination of a discounter has traditionally been based
upon the need to eliminate a "free rider."1 18 A free rider is a
113. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
114. See Piraino, supra note 32, at 12.
115. See infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
116. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984). See also
infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text. Assuming equal business efficiencies, the
dealer which provides the fewest services will be able to charge the lowest price.
117. See infra text accompanying note 194. The definition of per se illegal price
fixing often cited by the Court in the past is that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price ...

is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310

U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (emphasis in original). See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13, i7
(1964). For a recent lower court decision using this language, see World of Sleep, Inc. v.
La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1477 (10th Cir.) (relevant consideration is whether a
dealer is coerced, not whether a specific price is set), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985).
118. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
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dealer which does not provide the same presale services as other
dealers and, as a result, can charge a lower price.11 Customers
can thus utilize the presale services of the full-service dealer,
such as product explanations and demonstrations, and then obtain a lower price at a discounter. The full-service dealer, upset
at losing sales, may reduce services so that he can charge lower,
competitive prices, thus completely upsetting the manufacturer's
20
distribution strategy.1
With such divergent factors influencing their decisions,
lower court holdings have, not surprisingly, been inconsistent. 2 '
Courts have repeatedly disagreed over whether termination of
discounters in response to complaints from competitors created
a sufficient inference of a price fixing conspiracy to justify impo2
sition of per se illegality. 1
This confusion is exemplified by two Third Circuit opinions,
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.'2 8 and Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco.'" The court found in Cernuto that
if termination was in response to complaints, then "both the
purpose and the effect of the termination was to eliminate competition at the retail level, and not, as in Sylvania, to promote
competition at the manufacturer level.' 25 Moreover, the
Cernuto court characterized the restraint as horizontal because
it resulted from a competitor's complaints. 2 Similar reasoning

119. For explanations of the free rider concept, see Telser, supra note 110; Posner,
Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 285
(1975); Posner, supra note 52, at 6-10.
120. If a manufacturer is attempting to enhance sales by projecting an upscale image, this strategy may be defeated by a free-riding discounter. See, e.g., McCabes Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1728 (1988). For arguments in favor of free riders see Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1492-93;
Comanor, supra note 31, at 990-92.
121. See infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
122. Professor Areeda has distinguished independent decisions to terminate from
those which are a result of dealer coercion. "In the latter case, the manufacturer's compliance with the complainer's demand is more likely to be anticompetitive." 7 P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW 166 (1986). However, a complaint alone by a dealer does not constitute
coercive behavior.
123. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
124. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
125. 595 F.2d at 168.
126. Perhaps less confusion would have been caused if the Court had said the effect
is the same as if the restraint had been a horizontal restraint. This was the reasoning of
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to that in Cernuto was used by panels of the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, 12 7 Seventh, 12 8 Eighth,2 9 and
Ninth 30 Circuits in finding termination in response to complaints per se illegal.
Two years later, however, in Edward J. Sweeney & Sons,
Inc. v. Texaco,1 31 another panel of the Third Circuit obtained a
different result from that in Cernuto. The court held that termination in response to a competitor's complaints was insufficient
evidence from which to infer a price fixing conspiracy, especially
given that Sweeney's quality problems contributed to its own
termination. 132 The court stated that circumstantial evidence
could be used to prove the conspiracy, but that there must be
evidence of "a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective."1 33 Similar results to those in Sweeney were reached
1 4
by panels of United States Courts of Appeals for the First,
Second,"3 5 Sixth,13 6 Eighth, 13 7 Ninth,' 38 and Tenth 39 Circuits.

the Dr. Miles Court. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The confusion over use
of this terminology is perpetuated in Justice Stevens' dissent in Business Elecs. v. Sharp
Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988). See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. For an
explanation of this terminology in Cernuto, see 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 122, at 174;
Comment, Vertical Agreement as Horizontal Restraint:Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REV. 622 (1980). Congress has also considered these restraints as
horizontal and subject to rules of per se illegality. See supra notes 90, 92.
127. Bostick Oil Co., Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,Commercial Div., 702 F.2d 1207
(4th Cir.) (termination of tire discounter as a response to rivals' desire to eliminate a
price cutter is a per se violation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983).
128. Spray-Rite Serv. Co. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982) (termination of discount agricultural chemical distributor in response to competitors' complaints
is per se illegal), aff'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Alloy Int'l Co. v. HooverNSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980) (explicitly following Cernuto).
129. Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing,Battle
v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (equally divided court disagreed with
reasoning of earlier decision that termination at request of competing distributor, motivated by desire to eliminate price competition, is a per se violation), cert denied, 466
U.S. 931 (1984).
130. Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (termination of price-cutting valve distributor at the request of a competing distributor is a
per se violation).
131. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
132. Id. at 110-11.
133. Id. at 111.
134. Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1982) (no per se violation when insufficient evidence to show that complaints caused the termination or that a
conspiracy existed).
135. Schwimmer v. SONY Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.) (termination follow-
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This confusion in the circuits mandated resolution by the Supreme Court, which attempted to clarify this matter in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.'40
2. Monsanto and Subsequent Decisions
The issue in Monsanto was whether a discounter's termination was sufficiently connected to a competitor's complaint to
justify inferring a per se illegal conspiracy to fix prices.' 4 '
Spray-Rite was an authorized Monsanto distributor until its
termination in 1968 following numerous price complaints from
competing Monsanto distributors. 4 " After declining to renew
Spray-Rite's distributorship, Monsanto warned other price-cutters about similar termination if prices were not maintained.'43
It also described
its intent to keep prices up in its dealer
44
newsletter.
The Court first noted the importance of distinguishing independent action from concerted action and distinguishing price
restraints from nonprice restraints.' 45 Since complaints about
ing complaints from dealers about plaintiff's shipping from New York to areas where
volume discounts were not available was insufficient to find a violation of the Sherman
Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982). See also H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 662 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1981) (absent additional evidence, termination of a drug
wholesaler following competitors' complaints is insufficient to find an illegal agreement),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 639 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1980) (absent coercion of the supplier by the competitor, no per se violation exists), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
136. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982) (insufficient evidence of conspiracy to find per se violation).
137. Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (equally divided court) (complaints by
competitor combined with suggestion of price by manufacturer insufficient evidence of
conspiracy to find a per se violation). This case was heard by the en banc panel on the
same day as Watson, cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
138. Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 709 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.) (complaints are
insufficient evidence of causal nexus), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
139. Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981), later appeal, 721 F.2d
306 (10th Cir. 1983) (absent direct evidence of conspiracy, termination subsequent to
competitors' complaints inadequate to find per se liability).
140. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
141. Id. at 755, 759, 764.
142. Id. at 757, 759.
143. Id. at 765.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 761. Independent action is, of course, legal under the Colgate doctrine.
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free-riding discounters are a natural response of full-service
dealers, the Court declined to find a conspiracy from the "existence of complaints," even if the termination was " 'in response
to' complaints. 14 6 The Court held that something more was required, namely "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently.114 7 Justice Powell then stated that this evidence could be "direct or circumstantial . . . that reasonably
tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective.' ",148 The Court thus adopted the standard
proposed in Sweeney and rejected the Cernuto court's inference
of liability based on termination in response to complaints.149 In
spite of this increased evidentiary burden, the Court still held
that the evidence was sufficient to find per se illegality. 150 The
Court inferred a price fixing conspiracy from threats by Monsanto to withhold supplies from discounters and from an article
in the Monsanto newsletter exhorting dealers to "ge[t] the 'mar-

ket place in order.'

",151

Litigation after the Monsanto decision continued unabated.'5 2 Unlike Monsanto, these decisions have generally favored defendants and many have been grants of summary

judgment. 153

See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. Sylvania dictates that nonprice restraints
be judged by the rule of reason. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
146. 465 U.S. at 763.
147. Id. at 764.
148. Id. (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). The Court incrementally increased this
evidentiary burden in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986), where it held that an antitrust plaintiff could not withstand a defendant's motion
for summary judgment if the evidence was as consistent with independent action as concerted action. The Court narrowed the scope of concerted action in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), holding that a parent corporation is incapable of conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary.
149. See supra notes 123-139 and accompanying text.
150. 465 U.S. at 765.
151. Id. at 765-66 (citing Joint Appendix at A-65, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914)).
152. As of February, 1989, over 300 antitrust decisions have cited Monsanto
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
153. See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1987)(summary judgment affirmed), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 488; Lomar Wholesale Gro-
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Unfortunately, rather than establishing firm standards,
Monsanto left several issues unresolved.154 Foremost among
these is the Court's failure to define precisely what behavior
constitutes price fixing and is thus per se illegal. Two examples
will illustrate the confusion this failure has engendered.
In O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,1 55 a mail order discounter brought suit against Apple after being terminated. The
dealer showed significant evidence of a price fixing conspiracy:
(1) complaints to Apple about mail order dealers' price discounts;
(2) the outright and sudden elimination of mail order sales and
termination of those dealers who continued such sales; (3) several
meetings involving dealer and manufacturer representatives in
which mail order discounting was allegedly raised; (4) a conversational statement by Apple's president that while he could not legally discuss pricing, something was going to be done about price
erosion; (5) an incident in which Apple allegedly coerced mail order dealers to 'get their prices up;' (6) Apple's alleged conditioning of new locations for mail order dealers upon their agreement
to cease discounting; and (7) Apple's alleged agreement with one
of the plaintiffs to not advertise prices. 15
Nevertheless,1

57

the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence was

cery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 707 (1988); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 763 F.2d 604
(4th Cir. 1985) (summary judgment affirmed) (in the above cases, termination in response to complaints was held insufficient to find a per se violation in absence of agreement to set prices). Another factor weighing against antitrust plaintiffs is that advocates
of the efficiency theory of antitrust law have been on many of the benches which rendered post-Monsanto decisions. See Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines,
Inc., 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880
(1987); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Posner, J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) (decisions against terminated dealer upheld in all three cases). All is not lost for plaintiffs however, as some courts have allowed
vertical price fixing claims to go to the jury. See Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes
Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment against terminated
distributor denied); Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1985) (jury verdict for terminated shoe discounter upheld when manufacturer had discussed action with plaintiff's competitor).
154. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 1096-99; Hay, supra note 71, at 433-35.
155. 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 1468.
157. This evidence was assumed to be true for the purposes of a summary judgment
motion and as such would have been significantly more than the Supreme Court found
sufficient to infer a price fixing conspiracy in Monsanto. See supra text accompanying
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"insufficient proof of an antitrust conspiracy," and upheld the
trial court's grant of summary judgment. 5 '
Compare Apple with World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy
Chair Co. ,5e where the Tenth Circuit held evidence of a discounter's termination subsequent to a competitor's complaints,
combined with a taped telephone conversation between the competitor and the manufacturer agreeing to "keep [the] prices
up,"'6 0 sufficient to send the case to a jury, even though no specific prices were agreed to.' This evidence is significantly less
than the Ninth Circuit found insufficient in Apple and similar to
what the Supreme Court found sufficient in Monsanto. In light
of this continued inconsistency in defining the scope of an illegal
agreement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics. 162
III.
A.

Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics

The Facts

Kelton Ehrensberger, who later incorporated as Business
Electronics Corporation (BEC), was the sole dealer of Sharp
Electronics Corporation (Sharp) calculators in the Houston area
from 1968 until mid-1972.' Calculators were complex, unfamiliar products during this period and BEC concentrated on building its market share by selling at less than the suggested retail

note 151.
158. Apple, 792 F.2d at 1468-69.
159. 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985).
160. Id. at 1476.
161.. Id.
162. Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987) (certiorari granted). The
cases cited by the Court as evidence of the disagreement among the circuits were McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986)
(termination of dealer which did not comply with customer restriction not illegal unless
price fixing agreement proved); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d
1216 (10th Cir. 1986) (refusal to grant kitchen equipment dealership not per se illegal
unless an agreement to fix prices exists), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983); Cernuto, Inc. v.
United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S.
Ct. 1515, 1517 n.1 (1988).
163. Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 780 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
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price, rather than by offering presale services. 6 4
As their business relationship continued, "Sharp became
dissatisfied with BEC's performance."''
In mid-1972 Sharp
threatened to cancel BEC's dealership. 6' Sharp maintained that
this threat was due to BEC's poor sales performance, allegedly
caused by inadequate presale service. 67 BEC presented evidence
at trial, however, that Sharp's real concern was BEC's discount
pricing.18
As a result of Sharp's concerns, it appointed Gilbert Hartwell as a second area dealer.'
Hartwell offered full presale
services, and there is evidence that he was initially offered an
exclusive dealership, understanding that BEC would be terminated. 17 0 Sharp, desiring to learn more about the market before
7
taking any action, did not terminate BEC.1 1
Although Hartwell was free to charge any price he wanted,
and sometimes did give discounts, he generally adhered to
Sharp's suggested pricing schedule. 17 2 He complained bitterly
about BEC's prices, alleging that BEC was "free riding" on his
presale services. 73 The complaints included conversations with
and letters to Sharp's regional sales representative, national
74
sales manager, and vice-president.
Finally, in June, 1973, Hartwell gave "an ultimatum to
Sharp - unless Sharp terminated BEC within 30 days, Hartwell would terminate his own Sharp dealership. Sharp re7
sponded by terminating BEC.'

164. Id. at 1215; Respondent's Brief at 3, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct.
1515 (1988) (No. 85-1910).
165. 780 F.2d at 1215.
166. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)
(No. 85-1910).
167. 780 F.2d at 1215; Respondent's Brief at 3.
168. 780 F.2d at 1215. Sharp's Texas representative complained to BEC about its
"'messing up' the market and 'creating dealer complaints.'" Petitioner's Brief at 3.
Sharp's vice-president told BEC's owner to "'clean up his pricing structure.'" Id. at 4.
169. 780 F.2d at 1215.
170. Respondent's Brief at 4-5.
171. 780 F.2d at 1215.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Petitioner's Brief at 4.
175. 780 F.2d at 1215.
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B. Lower Court Decisions
In response to its termination, BEC filed suit in the Western District of Texas alleging violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'7 6 The case was tried before a jury. 17 7 The court instructed the jury that a per se illegal agreement existed if BEC's
termination was subsequent to an agreement between Hartwell
and Sharp to eliminate price cutting. 178 The jury found the exis7
tence of such an agreement and returned a verdict for BEC.1 9
The trial court judge denied Sharp's motion for judgment not80
withstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial.1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit repudiated the district court's
theory of liability. 8 ' It held that termination of a discounter to
eliminate price competition was inadequate evidence to support
a finding of per se liability because "abstract lessening of intrabrand competition is not enough."' 82 Acknowledging its conflict with decisions in other circuits, 183 the court reasoned that
since many nonprice restraints, which are not per se illegal, have
direct impact on prices,'8 " the nonterminated "distributor must
expressly or impliedly agree to set its prices at some level,
though not a specific one.' 185 The court did not explain how par-

176. Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., No. 78 Civ. 1020 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 1975),
rev'd, 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
177. 780 F.2d at 1214.
178. The jury charge was: "The Sherman Act is violated when a seller enters into an
agreement or understanding with one of its dealers to terminate another dealer because
of the other dealer's price cutting." 780 F.2d at 1215. In its introductory statement, the
jury instruction stated:
The general objectives of the antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, are to
preserve and advance our system of free and open competition, and to secure to
everyone an equal opportunity to engage in a business trade and commerce of this
country - a policy which is the primary feature of our private enterprise system.
Joint Appendix at JA-14, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988) (No. 851910). Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court commented on this introductory
statement.
179. Petition for cert. at 24a, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)
(No. 85-1910).
180. Id.
181. 780 F.2d at 1215.
182. Id. at 1216 (quoting Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1116 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
183. 780 F.2d at 1216.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1218. The court used Monsanto to support this heightened evidentiary
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ties could fix prices at a level without being specific.1 86
After holding BEC's evidence inadequate to support per se
illegality based on this strict standard, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision."' BEC's request for a rehearing en
banc was denied."" 5 BEC then appealed to the Supreme Court
and was granted certiorari.1 ""
C.

Opinion of the Supreme Court
1.

The Majority

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that per
se illegality should have a narrow scope and that the Fifth Circuit had set forth the appropriate standard.1 9 0 He interpreted
Sylvania and Monsanto as dictating:
that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason standard;
that departure from that standard must be justified by demonstrable economic effect .. .; that interbrand competition is the
primary concern of the antitrust laws; and that rules in this area
should be formulated with a view towards protecting the doctrine
of GTE Sylvania."'1
The Court was concerned about the inability of juries to
distinguish legitimate conduct designed to enhance services from
a conspiracy to restrict competition, given that "price cutting
standard. Id. at 1217. In her concurrence, Judge Jones took the opportunity to assault
the per se rule against vertical price restraints. "I believe this case perfectly illustrates
the arguments why vertical price restraints should be tested under antitrust's Rule of
Reason rather than, as Monsanto continues to require, per se illegality. There is no social
benefit to subjecting manufacturers' pricing relationships with their distributors to potential per se illegality ...." Id. at 1221 (Jones, J., concurring).
186. One possibility would be a fixed mark-up above the wholesale price. If the
wholesale price fluctuates, the price fixed would not be a specific one. It seems, however,
that even in a market with fluctuating prices like that for calculators in the early 1970s, a
manufacturer would publish new suggested retail prices when it changed its wholesale
prices.
187. 780 F.2d at 1219-20.
188. Petition for certiorari at 2, Business Elecs. v. Sharp. Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515
(1988) (No. 85-1910).
189. Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987) (certiorari granted).
190. Business Elecs., 108 S.Ct. at 1519-21.
191. Id. at 1520-21. Justice Scalia ignored the clear impact on prices, concentrating
on whether the agreement had the potential for reducing output. Id. at 1521. See supra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand. 1 9 2
It felt that if agreements such as that between Hartwell and
Sharp to eliminate dealers which are not providing what the
manufacturer considers adequate services are per se illegal, manufacturers would forego improvements to their distribution system rather than risk antitrust liability by terminating those
dealers. 19 3
After slightly modifying the Fifth Circuit's standard to require that an agreement on prices or price levels be proved
before finding per se liability,' Justice Scalia then paradoxically stated that the evidentiary difficulty cannot be resolved by
"invalidating as illegal per se only those agreements imposing
vertical restraints that contain the word 'price,' or that affect the
'prices' charged by dealers."' 9 5 Although he did not explain this
statement, the discussion of Sylvania directly following it indicates that it may be an invitation to further challenges to the
96
per se rule against vertical price fixing.
The remainder of the majority opinion is devoted to repudiating Justice Stevens' dissent, stating that the common-law prohibition of restraints on alienation is inapplicable because the
restraint at issue is not a price restraint;19 7 the per se prohibition
of horizontal price restraints is irrelevant to vertical agreements; 1 group boycott cases are inapplicable because they involve horizontal combinations;' 99 and precedents cited by the
dissent do not stand for the proposition that per se illegality
does not require the setting of a price or price level.20 0

192. Id. at 1521. As the dissent points out, however, this type of fact finding by a
jury is the heart of our judicial process. Id. at 1534 & n.17, 18. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1521. Given the probability that a manufacturer may terminate a discounter to implement improvements to its distribution scheme, the Court stated that a
price fixing agreement does not so often follow from discounter termination to warrant
per se illegality. Id. at 1523.
194. Id. at 1525.
195. Id. at 1521.
196. Id. at 1521-22.
197. Id. at 1524.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1525. Justice Scalia criticized Justice Stevens' perpetuation of the confusion caused in Cernuto by his characterization of dealer termination based upon competitor complaints as a horizontal restraint. Id. at 1523 n.4. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
200. 108 S. Ct. at 1525. Justice Scalia also criticized the dissent's characterization of
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The Dissent

Emphasizing the difficulty of determining whether Sharp's
conduct was a price or a nonprice restraint, Justice Stevens argued that the inquiry should focus on the nature of the restraint." 1 He acknowledged the lack of on-point precedent and
made comparisons to other agreements involving both clearly
unilateral actions by the manufacturer, which are not per se illegal, and those in which a group of competing dealers coerce the
manufacturer to terminate the discounter, which are per se
illegal.2 °2
Since the consequences to BEC were identical to those
which would result if a group of manufacturers or distributors
conspired to exclude it from the market, the dissent argued that
group boycott cases should control. 0 3 Because the only distinguishing feature is the number of conspirators involved, not
whether the agreement is horizontal or vertical, Justice Stevens
argued that the same rules should apply:
Precisely the same goal was sought and effected in this
case - the elimination of price competition at the dealer level.
Moreover, the method of achieving that goal was precisely the
same in both cases - the manufacturer's refusal to sell to discounting dealers .... [T]he difference is simply a difference in
the number of conspirators. 0 4

the agreement as a "naked" restraint. He pointed out that it is only a naked restraint if
one assumes Sharp has no valid business justification for terminating BEC. Id. at 1522
n.3. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
201. 108 S. Ct. at 1526-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens focused on the
distinction between naked and ancillary restraints made in Judge Taft's seminal opinion
in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899). See supra note 20. Justice Stevens noted that this opinion is "universally accepted as authoritative ... [and has been praised as] 'one of the greatest, if not
the greatest, antitrust opinions in the history of the law.'" 108 S.Ct. at 1527 (quoting R.
BORK, supra note 26, at 26).
202. 108 S. Ct. at 1529.
203. Id. at 1531-32. These cases include United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966) (group of competitor's influencing manufacturer to terminate discounters
held per se illegal), and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(boycott of store owner by manufacturers at behest of competitor held per se illegal).
204. 108 S.Ct. at 1532. The counter-argument, of course, is that no conspiracy at all
was involved and that Sharp's action was unilateral. The response to this counter-argument is that the jury found that a conspiracy did exist, a finding that neither the Fifth
Circuit nor the majority took issue with. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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The dissent was also troubled by the majority's "failure to
attach any weight to the value of intrabrand competition."' 0 5 Although Sylvania expressed the primacy of interbrand competition over intrabrand competition, it did not state that preservation of intrabrand competition is not important, only that
interbrand competition is more important. 0 6
In its final argument, the dissent stated that the Monsanto
evidentiary hurdle is adequate to prevent liability where the
manufacturer is legitimately attempting to improve his distribution system: (1) there must be "'evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently,"' 20 (2) "the terminated
dealer must prove that the agreement was based on a purpose to
terminate it because of its price cutting,"2 0 8 and (3) the inference of price fixing may be rebutted by showing reasons for termination unrelated to price.2" 9
In concluding, Justice Stevens used a quote from one of the
main proponents of the efficiency model, former Judge Bork, to
support his position: "[s]ince the naked boycott is a form of
predatory behavior, there is little doubt that it should be a per
se violation of the Sherman Act." '
IV.

Analysis

Business Electronics demonstrates the anomalous result
which occurs when conduct is judged per se illegal, or only illegal
if unreasonable,"' depending on a factor as ill-defined as
whether it is a vertical price or nonprice restraint. Since the Supreme Court has continued to acknowledge that certain conduct
should be per se illegal,2 12 per se rules should be fashioned to
205. 108 S. Ct. at 1532.
206. Id. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
207. 108 S. Ct. at 1534 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 764 (1984)).
208. Id. at 1534-35.
209. Id. at 1535.
210. R. BORK, supra note 26, at 334. The majority opinion makes clear, however,
that the Court considered BEC and Hartwell's conduct neither a naked restraint nor a
boycott. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. Congress has also continued its
support for application of per se illegality in appropriate cases. See supra notes 90, 92.
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implement the purposes of the Sherman Act: preservation of
competition by allowing all qualified competitors to compete.21 3
Conduct with a high probability of subverting this intent should
be per se illegal.
A.

Price/NonpriceDistinction

As Business Electronics aptly demonstrates, it is very difficult to distinguish price from nonprice vertical restraints in
cases where a discounter is terminated subsequent to a competitor's complaint.2 1 Furthermore, "the economic effect of... unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, [and] agreements on
price and nonprice restrictions - is in many, but not all, cases
similar or identical."2 '15 If a manufacturer desires to induce
presale services, then the termination may be beneficial. 1 6 If the
termination is a result of coercion by a competitor, however, its
result may be increased prices to consumers without any benefit.217 Because of the potential for harm to consumers, some vertical restraints, including some which do not specifically set
prices, should be illegal without an elaborate investigation into
their competitive effects."' 0
Since the Sherman Act is a statutory creation, the intent of
213. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
215. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984). This point is
not disputed by opponents of per se illegality for vertical restraints. See Easterbrook,
supra note 5, at 140-43; Posner, supra note 52, at 6-10.
216. See supra notes 109-11, 118-20 and accompanying text. The assumptions used
by advocates of the efficiency model in coming to this conclusion are "that the market is
perfectly competitive, that a supplier's motive ... is to maximize output, that complex
organizations behave in accord with the model's definitions, and that the aggregate of
the micro will reflect the macro common good." Flynn, supra note 33, at 1127. On the
other hand, some consumers may have no need for presale services. From their perspective, the only result of the restraint is higher prices. See Comanor, supra note 31, at 99092.
217. Advocates of the efficiency theory insist that no rational manufacturer will allow this behavior since it will reduce output and ultimately, his profit. See Easterbrook,
supra note 5, at 140-42. Other motivations influence behavior, however: "Business managers frequently act in order to realize personal goals, including political power or personal security within their firms, as well as to build empires." Fox, supra note 23, at
1170.
218. Were this not so, the practical difficulties preventing a plaintiff from prevailing
in a case using the rule of reason standard would allow harmful behavior to go unpunished. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Congress is relevant to this discussion. Although advocates of
the efficiency model insist that vertical restraints will not have
anticonsumer effects,2 19 Congress clearly found to the contrary
when it repealed the Fair Trade Laws.2 2 Additinally, Congress
re-emphasized its approval of per se rules in 1985 when it repudiated the Justice Department's Vertical Restraint Guidelines.2 21
Although not passed in the 100th Congress, a bill was proposed in 1987 which would legislatively roll back the evidentiary
requirement dictated in Monsanto.211 Even though the pronouncements of a subsequent Congress are not always relevant
in determining the intent of a Congress which originally passed
a bill, "[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier
223
statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.
Although Congressional statements describing the intent of a
bill not passed are not particularly relevant,2 2 those accompanying the 1975 Act and contained in the 1985 Act supporting retention of per se illegality for certain vertical restraints should
certainly be accorded greater weight by the courts than they appear to have been given.
If the stimulation of product demand through provision of
presale services is the real goal of a vertical restraint, then contractual arrangements could be used to achieve that goal, thus
eliminating any dispute about the manufacturer's motive before
it occurs.2 29 When contractual arrangements provide for neces219. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 26, at 290-91; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 147.
220. See supra note 92.
221. See supra note 90.
222. The proposed bill would allow an inference of illegal activity if the termination
of the discounter was " 'in response to' price-related communications from a rival dealer
to a common supplier." H.R. REP. No. 421, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprintedin 53
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 763, 770 (Nov. 12, 1987).
223. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
224. "[Tlhe Supreme Court most often relies on Congressional inaction when there
has been active deliberation in response to administrative or judicial interpretations of
statutes - so that the 'inaction' is arguably a reasoned acquiescence .... W. ESKRIDGE
& P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION - STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 773 (1988).
225. See Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1493. Since vertical restraints are also imposed
by contract, this suggestion would not burden the parties with an additional contract
negotiation. See Piraino, supra note 32, at 5. This approach would directly impose requirements for the desired results on the dealer, not indirectly through imposition of
vertical restraints.
Reliance on a higher price, for instance, to achieve the objective of increased presale
services does not tell a dealer what that objective is. See Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1493.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss3/4

32

1989]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

sary pre-sale services, the expectations of both parties are then
clearly spelled out, making disputes less likely. When the inevitable disputes do arise, they can be resolved through actions to
enforce the terms of the contracts, which are inherently less
complex than antitrust actions. 2 6 It necessarily follows that the
parties to the contract will be protected from antitrust liability
because the document will clearly spell out the requirement for
increased services, which would not be judged an unreasonable
restraint on trade.22
B. Proposed Evidentiary Standard
To determine whether per se liability is warranted when a
manufacturer terminates a discounter pursuant to a competitor's
complaints, a court should examine whether the defendant has a
significant market share, whether the product's consumers are
primarily replacement buyers,228 the complexity of the product,
and its uniqueness. 2 2 9 A court would then choose whether per se
liability is appropriate depending on whether or not the combiIn fact, if the dealer in question has multiple products, "the idea that the manufacturer
can induce better services or more amenable surroundings by raising the retail price on
one item is ridiculous." Id. Advocates of the efficiency theory, however, argue that it is
not necessary to specify what services are to be provided. By the manufacturer fixing the
higher prices, a dealer's only intrabrand competitive advantage is the provision of more
services. Moreover, the higher price enables them to afford providing these services. See
Posner, supra note 119, at 283-84.
Termination of a dealer for noncompliance with the restraints poses an unnecessary
inefficiency since temporary market dislocation results when the manufacturer must
bring a new dealer into its distribution system. It is in a manufacturer's best interest to
have as much intrabrand competition as possible, since this will lower consumer costs
and therefore increase sales volume. See Piraino, supra note 32, at 5. Cf. Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (irrational dislocation will result from
preventing a manufacturer from reacting in response to a complaint).
226. See supra note 52 for an example of the complexity of antitrust cases. The
Court has stated that antitrust is "complex ... litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles ....
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
227. Even prior to Monsanto, if a rational reason for terminating a dealer other
than price fixing existed, no liability would be found. See, e.g., Schwimmer v. SONY
Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981) (dealer had submitted false advertising vouchers for which it had been given credit), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982). See also Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (dealer repeatedly violated
customer restrictions).
228. Replacement buyers are previous purchasers of a product who are either
purchasing a new or additional item. See generally Comanor, supra note 31, at 990-92.
229. See infra notes 232-43 and accompanying text.
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nation of these factors shows that harm to competition is
likely.2 30 A defendant would then be free to rebut the presumption of illegal conduct.2 1
1. FactorsIndicating Probabilityof Harm to Competition
Having determined that per se rules should be retained, and
that the distinction between price and nonprice vertical restraints is not a valid index in cases where a discounter is terminated subsequent to a competitor's complaints, a sufficiently
stringent test must be developed to impose per se liability in
appropriate cases without deterring conduct unlikely to harm
competition. By applying a set of objective factors which courts
can use to balance the probability of harm to competition
against the potential benefits of efficient distribution, the current irrational policy, as exemplified by Business Electronics,
can be rectified.
The most important factor in determining whether harm to
competition is likely to occur when a manufacturer terminates a
discounter pursuant to a competitor's complaints is whether the
product in question has a significant market share.23 2 Determination of what market share is significant to show market power
has caused problems for courts in monopoly cases.2 33 Factors influencing this determination have included market concentration,2 3' uniqueness of the product,2 35 and the applicable geographic market.23 6
230. See infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
232. In this respect, the proposed analysis is similar to market power determination
in a monopoly case. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(depending on how the market is defined, defendant's market share varied between
thirty-three percent and ninety percent).
234. Market concentration is the degree to which a small number of companies control most of a particular market. In a recent case in the Seventh Circuit, for example, the
court enjoined acquisition of one industrial dry corn seller by another, pending completion of FTC proceedings, because there were only six firms of any significance in the
market. The court considered this to be a high degree of concentration. FTC v. Elders
Grain Inc., 57 U.S.L.W. 2469 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 1989). See also Telser, supra note 110, at
88.
235. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
236. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 3, at 91-112. See also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 48, at 321-88.
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Since the same types of problems as those in determining
market power in monopoly cases may occur in determining significant market share in discounter termination cases, a court
should not undertake an elaborate inquiry, such as it would in a
rule of reason analysis.2 3 7 Only in those cases in which the market share in question is very small, such as when a company is
either newly entering a market or, although established, has
been unsuccessful in its competitive activities, should a market
share be considered insignificant. However, no firm line should
be drawn; if the market share is arguably significant, the inquiry
should continue forward to whether the reduction in intrabrand
competition resulting from terminating a discounter is likely to
be offset by increases in interbrand competition.2 38
This increase in interbrand competition is likely to occur
only if the level of presale services maintained by the termination is desired or required by the market in question.2 9 The
other three factors address this point: whether the product's
consumers are primarily replacement buyers, the complexity of
the product, and the uniqueness of the product.
If customers are not interested in or have no need for
presale services, price increases caused by providing them will
not benefit consumers or increase interbrand competition.2 4
Customers who fall into this category are often return buyers of
an established product who are already knowledgeable about the
product." 1 Buyers of a newly developed product or new buyers,
however, are likely to need the kind of presale services which
vertical restraints can induce. The key to this factor is thus
whether the consumers of a given product are primarily replace237. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
238. This is the same principle advocated by the Court in examining typical nonprice vertical restraints. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-56
(1977).
239. Id. at 55.
240. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
241. See Comanor, supra note 31, at 990-92. The efficiency school argument to this
point is that interbrand competition will resolve this problem since these consumers will
buy a competing product if they do not value the presale services more than the increase
in prices. See Piraino, supra note 32, at 5. But many of these consumers are "inframarginal" - they are willing to pay more for the product than the price which existed
prior to imposition of the requirement for presale services. These consumers will continue to buy the product yet receive no benefit from the increased presale services. See
Comanor, supra note 31, at 990-92.
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ment buyers.
Another consideration is that the complexity of a product
will dictate the degree of presale services required. There should
be no need for extensive presale services for simple products and
thus no reason for the imposition of vertical restraints intended
to induce these services.2 "2
Finally, if a product is unique, by definition it has little or
no interbrand competition. There should be no need for presale
services besides advertising for a unique product unless it is either complex or its consumers are predominantly first-time
2 3
buyers.
In applying this four-part standard, the first determination
should be whether the terminated dealer is a discounter and has
been terminated pursuant to a competitor's complaints. If it is
not a discounter, consumers are not harmed by the termination
since they can purchase the product for the same price elsewhere.24 4 If the manufacturer has acted without input from
others, there has been no "contract, combination ...or conspiracy""" and the Colgate doctrine applies.2 46
Once it has been determined that a discounter was terminated pursuant to a competitor's complaints, the next inquiry is
24 7
whether the terminating party has a significant market share.
If not, the illegality of the termination should be analyzed using
the rule of reason.
If the terminating party has a significant market share, then
the analysis proceeds to whether any of the other three factors is
present: (1) whether the buyers are primarily new buyers; (2)
whether the product is complex; and (3) whether the product is

242. Although advertising is not, strictly speaking, a customer service, it may be
required to promote a product. The dealer may thus require some of the protection provided by vertical restraints even for simple products. See Posner, supra note 52, at 4-5.
For a general discussion of antitrust considerations of advertising, see R. BORK, supra
note 26, at 314-20.
243. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text. For example, the manufacturer
of a unique, complex product attempting to break into an established market may require presale promotion and services.
244. The competing dealer which complained presumably has a ready supply
available.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
246. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
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unique.248 If any of these factors is present, the manufacturer
has a legitimate concern about pre-sale services and it is plausible that the termination is a result of these concerns."" The termination should then be judged using the rule of reason. Only if
none of these factors is present should the termination be per se
illegal.
An exception to the above test should be applied in those
cases where the terminated discounter's retail operation is a
large, multiproduct outlet. In those cases, increased prices are
unlikely to produce the increased services allegedly desired by
the manufacturer.250 Unless the manufacturer can show that the
discounter refused to agree contractually to provide presale services, its termination should then be judged per se illegal if the
manufacturer has a significant market share. 5 1
Although this test obviously does not provide a bright line
standard, using it to determine the scope of per se illegality in a
case where a discounter is terminated pursuant to a competitor's
complaints will effectuate the purposes of antitrust law. The
proposed test requires a more searching inquiry than is applied
in most per se illegality cases,2 52 but it does not require examination of the market effect of the termination, which would be required in a rule of reason analysis.2 53 Reliance on a bright line
standard between price and nonprice vertical restraints has led
to the disparate treatment which similar conduct receives today.2 54 Our judicial system is accustomed to performing balancing tests; 55 to require it to perform an evaluation of several ob-

248. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
249. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
250. See supra note 225.
251. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
252. In vertical price fixing cases, for example, all that is required to apply per se
illegality is the existence of an agreement to set prices. See supra notes 68-92 and accompanying text. Cf. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), where the
Court examined whether particular reciprocal dealing had a probable anticompetitive
impact before implicitly holding it per se illegal.
253. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
255. For example, the law of torts abounds with balancing tests. To determine if a
duty exists in a negligence action, the utility of an actor's conduct must be balanced
against the probability and severity of the harm risked. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 171 (5th ed. 1984). In
an action for nuisance, the gravity of the harm from the activity must exceed the utility
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jective factors to determine the proper evidentiary standard in
discounter termination cases should not be an undue burden.
2.

Business Electronics

Application of the proposed test to Business Electronics
yields a result which agrees with that of the Court: the potential
antitrust violation resulting from Sharp's termination of BEC
should be judged using the rule of reason.
Calculators in the early 1970's, were relatively new.2 5' The
competition for business was fierce, and the market consisted of
25 7
many firms with small market shares selling similar products.
Sharp's market share was thus not significant, and the harm to
intrabrand competition caused by BEC's termination was not
likely to harm interbrand competition.2 5 8 Under the proposed
test, the inquiry terminates here and dictates that the illegality
of Sharp's actions be judged using the rule of reason.2 5e Even if
Sharp's market share had been significant, application of the
other proposed factors would dictate that the rule of reason be
used. 260 Not only were calculators new and their consumers thus
primarily first-time buyers, but their operation was also complex.2 61 Because many competing calculators offered similar features, any particular product was not unique.2 62 Thus all of the
factors which show that Sharp would have a legitimate concern
for presale services were present. The large, multiproduct outlet
exception would not apply because "BEC's only business was to
buy calculators from Sharp ...and sell them at retail. ' 263 Application of the proposed test thus clearly shows that Sharp's termination of BEC should be judged using the rule of reason.
of the conduct for the conduct to be considered unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979).
256. Respondent's Brief at 3, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)
(No. 85-1910).
257. Id. at 8.
258. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
259. See text accompanying note 247.
260. See supra notes 239-43, 248-49 and accompanying text.
261. Respondent's Brief at 3, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988)
(No. 85-1910).
262. Id. at 8.
263. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)
(No. 85-1910).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss3/4

38

1989]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
V.

Conclusion

The purpose of the Sherman Act is to assure fairness to
consumers by preserving the right of business entities to compete in the marketplace.2 6' The rules which have resulted from
the Act's common-law evolution dictate that most vertical price
restraints are per se illegal,265 whereas vertical nonprice restraints are illegal only if proven to be unreasonable. 66
Rather than attempting to remedy the disparate treatment
which results from using this distinction to evaluate the potential antitrust violation in a discounter termination case, the Supreme Court dictated that only restraints which include an
agreement on price or price levels are per se illegal. 6 7 The results of this reasoning produce a dividing line similar to that
drawn in Schwinn between nonprice restraints on buyers as opposed to the same restraints on consignees, which the Court repudiated in Sylvania.6 8 The Court has just drawn the line in a
different place for a different type of restraint. Hopefully this
artificial distinction will be repudiated more quickly than was
the distinction in Schwinn. 6 9
The goals of the Sherman Act can be realized in a discounter termination case only by having judicial standards
which focus on the probable effects of a discounter's termination. The test proposed to determine the probability of harm to
competition would require a court to examine a set of objective
factors to determine if a discounter's termination was contrary
to the goals of the Sherman Act. If the court concluded that a
discounter's termination was contrary to these goals, the court
would declare it per se illegal. In this way, potentially beneficial conduct will not be condemned because it fits into a certain
category and truly harmful conduct will be recognized as such.
Using this test, the conduct of Sharp in Business Electronics
264. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
267. Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1525 (1988).
268. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977). See
supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
269. Ten years elapsed between Schwinn and Sylvania. See supra notes 101-08 and
accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
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would be judged using the rule of reason.2 71
Dissatisfaction with the results of the common-law evolution of the Sherman Act exists both among advocates who wish
to constrict the scope of per se illegality as well as among those
who would preserve or expand it.2 7' Failure to adopt a rational
approach, such as the one suggested, will only preserve the unsatisfactory current approach, shifting the line dividing per se
illegal from rule of reason cases as the political and economic
climate change and as different antitrust theories pass in and
out of vogue.
James R. Warnot, Jr.

271. See supra notes 256-63 and accompanying text.
272. See R. BORK, supra note 26; Easterbrook, supra note 5; Posner, supra note 52.
Cf. Flynn, supra note 33; Pitofsky, supra note 11; Comanor, supra note 31.
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